We cannot read your objects
Encryption happens on the gateway you run, before a byte leaves your building. The key material is derived on your host from your own secret.
Why not: we never receive the key. There is no XNS-side copy, no escrow, no recovery path we could be compelled to use. If you lose your key material, we cannot help you either — that is the same fact stated from the other direction, and it is the honest cost of this design.
We cannot see your bucket names or object keys
Buckets, keys, sizes, folder structure, versions, tags and access times live in the gateway's own database, on your host. They are never replicated to us.
Why not: the XNS-side service that handles contracting and settlement — the only system that ever talks to your Relayer about money — contains zero occurrences of the word “bucket.” It has no field for one. A system cannot report what it has no concept of. The complete list of what does reach us is published on the metadata page.
We cannot watch your reads
No XNS coordinator sits in the request path. Your Relayer talks to storage operators directly; retrievals do not route through us.
Why not: there is nowhere for an access log to accumulate on our side. Who read what, when, and from where — the record that is frequently worth more than the files — is written on your host and stays there.
Storage operators cannot reconstruct your data
Objects are erasure-coded 80+40 and dispersed across independent operators you selected. Each holds a fraction, and each fraction is already encrypted.
Why not: no single operator holds enough shards to rebuild an object even in principle, and none of them holds a key in any case. Two independent barriers, not one.
We cannot hand over what we do not hold
A legal order compels a party to produce what it has. What we have is an installation identifier, aggregate byte counts and performance measurements.
Why not: this is not a claim that we would refuse — refusing is a policy and policies lose in court. It is that the response to a demand for your object contents or your file names would be the same either way, because the material does not exist on our side to produce.
We cannot lock you in
The interface is the S3 API. Your data comes out with rclone, the AWS CLI, or whatever you already use, and egress costs nothing.
Why not: there is no proprietary protocol to strand you and no retrieval fee to make leaving expensive. A provider that charges for reads has a financial interest in you never testing the exit; we do not have that lever, which is why we can invite you to test it.